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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Case originated with a claim for permanent total 
disability before the Industrial Commission of Utah under the 
Worker's Compensation Act. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 35-1-83. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Did the Industrial Commission err as a matter of law when 
it applied the 1984 Amendment to Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69 
in allocating permanent total disability and reirabursement liability 
between the Second Injury Fund on the one hand and the 
employer/carrier on the other? 
III. STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69 (as amended. 1984). the 
full text of which is set forth in the Addendum. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Case. 
Sylvia Pellegrini sustained an industrial injury with Wicat 
Systems in June 1983. She filed an application with the Industrial 
Commission alleging permanent total disability from the accident. 
She had pre-existing impairments. The parties stipulated that she 
was permanently and totally disabled. The parties also stipulated 
to the impairment ratings. The only issue for adjudication was the 
apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. 
(b) Course of Proceedings. 
On January 2. 1987. Sylvia Pellegrini filed an application with 
the Industrial Commission of Utah alleging permanent total 
disability. (R. at 31-32) Following a prehearing attorneys1 
conference. (R. 49, 50.) the Administrative Law Judge entered his 
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Order on December 29, 1987. Plaintiffs moved for the review of the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order on the ground that the 
apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund should 
have been on the basis of Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69 as it 
existed prior to the 1984 Amendment. 
(c) Disposition Below. 
On March 14, 1988, the Industrial Commission of Utah entered an 
Order denying Wicat Systems1 and Hartford Insurance's Motion for 
Review, (R. at 65-66) holding that the allocation was proper under 
the 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69. 
(d) Statement of the Facts. 
1. On June 21, 1983, while employed by Wicat Systems, Sylvia 
Pellegrini injured her wrist while lifting a tray rack. 
2. Wicat Systems and Hartford Insurance paid medical expenses 
and temporary total disability and permanent partial disability 
benefits to the applicant for which they now seek reimbursement from 
the Second Injury Fund. 
3. On April 10. 1987. Mrs. Pellegrini filed an application 
for permanent total disability with the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 
4. The parties stipulated that Mrs. Pellegrini (a) had a 46% 
whole person permanent impairment for conditions existing prior to 
1980 and an additional 12% whole person permanent impairment for a 
condition arising between 1980 and the industrial incident of 1983; 
3 
(c) ana a 24% whole person permanent impairment for her 1983 
industrial accident. The parties stipulated also that Mrs. 
Pellegrinis knee was permanently and totally disabled. (R. 50) 
5. The parties could not agree on the apportionment of 
liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. 
6. The Administrative Law Judge applied the 1984 Amendment to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69 in apportioning liability 
between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, holding that the 
Amendment was remedial or procedural in nature and therefore, had 
application to the proceedings in this action which were all 
instituted after the 1984 Amendment to that Section. In so doing, 
the Administrative Law Judge assessed the employer liability for 
24/64ths or 37.5% of Mrs. Pellegrini's permanent total disability 
award for the first 312 weeks. The Second Injury Fund was assessed 
40/64ths or 62.5% of the first 312 weeks and was ordered to 
reimburse the employer for 62.5% of all medical expenses. 
7. On January 14. 1988. Wicat Systems and Hartford Insurance 
filed a Motion for Review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order on 
the ground that the apportionment between the employer and the 
Second Injury Fund should have been made pursuant to the provision 
of Section 35-1-69 prior to the 1984 Amendment. 
8. In its March 14. 1988 Order denying the Motion for Review, 
the Industrial Commission of Utah Stated: 
The Commission finds the only issue on review is the 
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proper manner in which to figure the proportionate shares 
of the Second Injury Fund and the Carrier. The Commission 
finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly figured the 
proportionate shares per the provisions of the amended 
statute. U.C.A. 35-1-69. The Commission views the 1984 
amendment as a procedural amendment and therefore finds 
that it is retroactive in nature and applies to all 
injuries adjudicated after passage of the amendment. . . . 
That amendment specifies that the percentage impairment 
attributable to the carrier is figured on an uncorabined 
basis, while the overall impairment is figured on a 
combined basis. 
(R. at 65-66.) 
9. On April 8. 1988. Wicat Systems and Hartford Insurance 
petitioned this Court for a review of the March 14, 1988 Order of 
the Industrial Commission denying their Motion for Review. (R. at 
68-69.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
properly applied the 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69 in their 
allocation of liability between the employer and the Second Injury 
Fund in this controversy. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPLICATION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE 
REMEDIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 
35-1-69 WAS NEITHER IMPROPER NOR UNREASONABLE IN THE 
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ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
It is the position of the Industrial Commission and the Second 
Injury Fund that the 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69 was remedial 
in nature to resolve the confusion resulting from the Supreme Court 
decisions in the Northwest Carriers. Inc. v. Industrial Commission 
in the Merz case. 639 P. 2d 138 (December 1981) and Kerans v. 
Industrial Commission. 713 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1985) on the one hand, and 
Jacobsen Construction v. Hair. 667 P. 2d 25 (Utah 1983) on the other 
hand, with respect to apportionment of disability benefits between 
the employer and the Second Injury Fund . In support of its 
position that the 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69 was remedial in 
nature, defendant refers to the recent opinion of this Court in 
Edward Alter v. Hales. Sand Se Gravel and/or Workers1 Compensation 
Fund of Utah filed November 23. 1987. (Attached as Addendum, Exhibit 
A) in which this Court used the following language: 
A remedial statute is one "That is designed to correct an 
existing law. redress an existing grievance, or introduce 
regulations conducive to the public good." Blacks Law 
Dictionary. 1163 (5th Ed. 1983). The changes to the 
statute made in HB208 appear to be remedial. The changes 
"redress an existing grievance" held by Mr. Hales and his 
insurer. The legislature, in passing the Bill, must have 
intended "to correct an existing law" and must have 
believed the changes would "introduce regulations 
conducive to the public good." 
This Court further referred to 73 Am. Jur. 2d statute Section 
11 (1974) describing remedial statutes as follows: 
Legislation which has been regarded as remedial in its 
nature includes statutes which abridge superfluities of 
6 
former laws, remedying defects therein. or mischiefs 
thereof, whether the previous dificulties were statutory 
or were patt of the common law. Remedial legislation 
implies an intention to reform or extend existing rights, 
and has fot its purpose the promotion of justice and 
advancement of public welfare and of important and 
beneficial public objects. The term applies to a statute 
giving a party a remedy where he had none, or different 
one. before. Another common use of the term "remedial 
statute" is to distinguish it from a statute conferring a 
substantive right. 
This Court also alluded to "Moore v. American Coal Company. 737 
P. 2d 989. 990 (Utah 1987). where the Supreme Court wrote: 
However, a statute that is procedural or remedial is 
applied to all cases arising after the effective date of 
the statute and to pending and accrued actions. 
Procedural statutes that do not "enlarge eliminate, or 
destroy vested and contractual rights" are applied to 
pending actions. 
Applying the language of this Court in the Hales. Sand & Gravel 
case, supra, the Industrial Commission properly found that the 1984 
Amendment to Section 35-1-69 was remedial in nature and. as such. 
applied to this action which was initiated after the passage of the 
1984 Amendment. The effect of the remedial statute amendment was to 
clarify the confusion and uncertainly engendered by the cases 
referred to above and to provide a method certain for the allocation 
of liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund in 
cases involving whole-man impairment caused by industrial injury on 
the one hand and combined impairment caused by the combination of 
the industrial injury and pre-existing impairments on the other 
hand. In this case, such application resulted in the assessment by 
the Industrial Commission of the whole-man impairment found by the 
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medical panel to be attributable to the industrial injury i.e. . . 
24% whole person impairment. as against the overall combined 
impairment of 64% whole person, for 37.5% of the applicant's initial 
312 weeks of permanent total disability benefits, with the Second 
Injury Fund responsible for the 62.5% remaining portion as set forth 
in the statute. 
Defendant is well aware of the Supreme Court's language in 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 704 P. 2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985) 
that " . . . In Workers' Compensation cases the benefits to be 
awarded to an injured worker are to be determined on the basis of 
the law as it existed at the time of the injury." The application 
by the Industrial Commission in this case of the 1984 Amendment to 
Section 35-1-69 is wholly consistent with that statement and with 
the Marshall case. The injured worker will receive his maximum 
permanent total disability entitlement. Indeed. in all cases 
applying the 1984 Amendment the injured worker will receive 
compensation benefits from the employer based on the whole-man 
contribution of the industrial injury to the combined impairment 
rating in accordance with the legislative intent as held by the 
Supreme Court in the Karens case where the Supreme Court held (713 
P. 2d at 53) that " . . . We. therefore, hold that plaintiff is 
entitled to compensation on the basis of the whole-man impairment 
ratings". Here again, it is defendant's position that the 1984 
Amendment as applied by the Commission in this case as well as all 
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others arising after March 29. 1984 requires that the injured worker 
be paid by the employer for his industrial injury on a whole-man 
impairment basis and provides a uniform and consistent basis for the 
handling of all disability cases involving a compensable combination 
of impairment from the industrial injury on the one hand and 
pre-existing injuries or conditions on the other. Such uniformity 
and consistency protect completely the rights of the injured worker 
and, in addition, comply completely with the definitions of a 
"remedial statute11 as set forth above. The 1984 Amendment indeed is 
a remedial statute and is one "that is designed to correct an 
existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce 
regulations conducive to the public good." Blacks Law Dictionary, 
supra. It is also a statute "which abridges superfluities of former 
laws, remedying defects therein, or mischiefs thereof, whether the 
previous dificulties were statutes or were part of the common law" 
as set forth in the definition found in 73 Am. Jur. 2d Section 11 
(1974) describing remedial statutes. Thus, the 1984 Statutory 
Amendment to Section 35-1-69, having been determined to be remedial 
in nature, must be applied to all cases arising after the effective 
date of the statute and to pending and accrued actions. See Moore 
v. American Coal Company 737 P. 2d at 990 (Utah 1987). Since this 
controversy arose after the enactment of the 1984 Amendment the 
Industrial Commission properly applied its provisions to the 




The 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69 was remedial in nature 
and therefore is properly applicable to the allocation of liability 
between the employer and the Second Injury Fund in this 
controversy. The Industrial Commission properly applied the 
provisions of that 1984 Amendment in accordance with the language 
and the intent of the amendatory provisions. The contention by the 
employer that the Commission as a matter of law improperly applied 
the amendatory provisions of the 1984 statute to this controversy is 
untenable. The Order of the Industrial Commission, therefore, 
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35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent inca-
pacity— Payment out of Second Injury Fund — 
Training of employee. 
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by 
accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury 
for which either compensation or medical care, or both, is provided by this 
chapter that results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or 
which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compensa-
tion, medical care, and other related items as outlined in Section 35-1-81, 
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the 
employer for such compensation, medical care, and other related items shall 
be for the industrial injury only. The remainder shall be paid out of the 
Second Im'urv Fund provided for in Subsection 35-1-68 (1). and shall be deter-
mined after assigning the impairment for the industrial injury on a whole 
person uncbmbined basis and then deducting this percentage from the total 
combined rating. This. combined impairment rating may not exceed 100%. 
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury, 
disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and com-
pensation, medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis 
of the combined injuries as provided in this Subsection (1), and (b) where there 
is no such aggravation, no award for combined injuries may be made unless 
the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the indus-
trialjinjury is, 10%,or greater and the percentage of permanent physical im-
pairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the industrial 
injury, is greater than 20%. In determining the impairment thresholds and 
assessment of liability in favor of the employee and apportionment between 
the carrier or employer and the Second Injury Fund, the permanent physical 
impairment attributable to the industrial injury or the pre-existing condition 
or overall impairment, shall be considered on a whole person uncombined 
basis. If the pre-existing incapacity referred to in this Subsection (l)(b) previ-
ously has.been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial 
disability under this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law, such compensation shall be deductedfrom the liabil-
ity assessed to the Second Injury Fund under this paragraph. 
If the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or othei 
related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subject to thi.« 
80 
WUKKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-69 
section, the employer or its insurance carrier shallbe responsible for all such 
temporary benefits, medical care, or other related items up to the end of the 
period of temporary total disability resulting from the industrial'ixyury.'*Any 
allocation of disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following 
such period shall be made between the employer or its insurer and the Second 
Injury Fund as provided for in this section, and any payments made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate share shall be 
recoverable at the time of the award for combined disabilities if any is made. 
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical panel set forth in 
Section 35-2-56, shall review all medical aspects of the case and. determine 
first, the total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes 'and -
conditions including the industrial injury; second/the percentage of perma-
nent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the 
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the'previously 
existing condition, whether due to accidental injury, disease, or congenital 
causes. The Industrial Commission shall then assess the liability for perma-
nent partial disability compensation and future medical care to the employer 
on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury only and any amounts remaining to be paid shall'be 
payable out of the Second Injury Fund. Medical expenses shall be paid in the 
first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Amounts, if any, which 
have been paid by the employer in excess of the portion attributable to the 
industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out of the Second Iiyury 
Fund upon written request and verification of amounts so expended. •* 
(2) The commission may increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid 
out of this special fund. This increase shall be used for the rehabilitation and 
training of any employee coming under this chapter as may be certified to the 
commission by the Rehabilitation Department of the^State Board of Education 
as being eligible for rehabilitation and training. There may not be paid out of 
such special fund for rehabilitation an amount in excess of $1,000. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; C.L. 1917, of subsec. (1); inserted the second and third 
§ 3140, subsec. 6; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. paragraphs of subsec. (1); inserted "permanent 
1933 & Co 1943, 42-1-65; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; partial disability" in the second sentence of the 
1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. last paragraph of subsec. (1); inserted "future" 
55, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; in the second sentence of the last paragraph of 
1969, ch. 86, § 7; 1973, ch. 67, § 6; 1981, ch. subsec. (1); substituted "any amounts remain-
287, § 4; 1984, ch. 79, § 1. ing to be paid hereunder" in the second sen-
Compiler's Notes. — The 1981 amendment tence of the last paragraph of subsec. (l).for 
substituted "either compensation or medical "the remainder"; inserted the provisions of the 
care, or both" in the first paragraph of subsec. present third sentence of the fourth paragraph 
(1) for "compensation and medical care"; in- of subsec. (1); inserted "upon written request 
serted "or which aggravates or is aggravated and verification of amounts so expended":in 
by such pre-existing incapacity" in the first the last sentence of the last paragraph of 
paragraph of subsec. (1); substituted "compen- subsec. (1); and made minor changes in phrase-
sation, medical care and other related items as ology and punctuation.' 
outlined" in the first paragraph of subsec. (1) - The 1984'amendment substituted "chapter" 
for "compensation and medical care, which for "title" in the first sentence of subsec. (1); 
medical care and other related items are out- added "and shall be determined after assigning 
lined"; inserted "and other related items" be- the impairment for the industrial iiyury on a 
fore "shall be" in the first paragraph of subsec. whole person uncombined basis and then de-
(1); substituted "second injury fund" in the first ducting this percentage from the total, com-
and last paragraphs of subsec. (1) for "special bined rating" to the second sentence of subsec. 
fund"; deleted "hereinafter referred to as the
 ((1); added, the third sentence to subsec. (1); in-
'sDeciaLfund"' at the end of the first paragraph - serted the second sentence in the!second para-
ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Edward Alter, State Treasurer 
and Custodian of the Uninsured 
Employers1 Fund and the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Hales Sand and Gravel and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Orme. NOV 2 31987 
Timothy M. Shea 
Cisrk cf the Court 
DAVIDSON, J u d g e : Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendants appeal from the Industrial Commissions denial 
of their motion for review of the administrative law judge's 
order requiring them to pay into the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
the sum mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2)(a) (1986). We 
reverse. 
Randi Hales was fatally injured, as a result of an 
accident arising out of or in the course of her employment with 
defendant Hales Sand and Gravel (Hales), on July 31, 1986. At 
the time of her death, Randi was 17 years old, had never 
married, and had no dependents. Defendant Hales was insured by 
defendant Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. That fund 
accepted liability to the Industrial Commission for the no 
dependent death benefit provided for in § 33-1-68(2)(a). The 
temporary death benefits order was entered by the 
administrative law judge on August 21, 1986, directing the sum 
of $3.0,000.00 be paid to the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
Defendant Hales' motion for review was received by the 
Industrial Commission on September 9, 1986, as was a similar 
motion from Randi's mother. Both motions were denied and this 
appeal followed. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 870013-CA 
F I L E D 
During the time this matter was proceeding, the father of 
the decedent, who owns defendant Hales Sand and Gravel, sought 
relief through the legislative process. Through his efforts, 
H.B. 208 was drafted and presented to the Utah Legislature. 
His lobbying efforts contributed substantially to its passage. 
On March 16, 1987, the bill was signed into law by the 
Governor. The new l?.w eliminated the payment of death benefits 
to the Uninsured Employers* Fund when a decedent left no 
dependents and provided alternative sources of funding. It 
became effective on July 1, 1987, eleven months after Randi's 
death. Defendants now argue that the changes to the law are 
remedial and therefore control this action. 
A remedial statute is one ••that is designed to correct an 
existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce 
regulations conducive to the public good." Black1s Law 
Dictionary 1163 (5th ed. 1983). The changes to the statute 
made in H.B. 208 appear to be remedial. The changes "redress 
an existing grievance" held by Mr. Hales and his insurer. The 
legislature, in passing the bill, must have intended "to 
correct an existing law" and must have believed the changes 
would "introduce regulations conducive to the public good."1 
In Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 
1987), the Court wrote: 
In workers* compensation cases, we 
determine the rights and liabilities of 
the parties as of the date when the 
accident at issue occurred. 
However, a statute that is procedural or 
remedial is applied to all cases arising 
after the effective date of the statute 
and to pending and accrued actions. 
Procedural statutes that do not "enlarge, 
1. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 11 (1974) describes remedial 
statutes as follows: 
Legislation which has been regarded as remedial in its nature 
includes statutes which abridge superfluities of former laws, 
remedying defects therein, or mischiefs thereof, whether the 
previous difficulties were statutory or were part of the 
common law. Remedial legislation implies an intention to 
reform or extend existing rights, and has for its purpose the 
promotion of justice and the advancement of public welfare and 
of .important and beneficial public objects. The term applies 
to a statute giving a party a remedy where he had none, or a 
different one, before. Another common use of the term 
"remedial statute" is to distinguish it from a statute 
conferring a substantive right. 
870013-CA 2 
eliminate, or destroy vested or 
contractual rights1* are applied to 
pending actions. 
(Citations omitted)(quoting State, Deo't of Social Sarv. v. 
Hioos. 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982))• 
"An action is deemed to be pending from 1 he time o*: its 
commencement until its final determination uron appeal, or 
until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is 
sooner satisfied*" Hiacrs. 656 P.2d at 1002 (quoting Boucofski 
v, Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 120 (1909)). If this 
action commenced with the temporary order, it was pending when 
the new law took effect on July 1, 1987. The new statute, 
being remedial in nature, applies to the action. The effect is 
to change the method of funding and to eliminate defendants' 
liability for the $30,000.00 no dependent payment. The 
temporary order must therefore be voided. 
The changes in the law may also be considered procedural 
because they change the method of funding the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. If this is the case, the new law will be 
applied since no "vested or contractual rights" are held by the 
Industrial Commission until one year after the date of death; 
until July 31, 1987, one month after the new law took effect on 
July 1, 1987. 
Because of our holding, it is not n^^essary to discuss the 
second issue raised by defendants. 
The ruling of the Industrial Commission is reversed and the 
case is remanded for administrative action in accordance with 
the above. 
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything significant 
to existing law and hence is not to be published in the Utah or 
Pacific Reporter. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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